In this paper we argue that Ireland's post-crisis economic recovery in Europe was driven by foreign direct investment (FDI) from Silicon Valley, and whilst this growth model was made possible by Ireland's low corporate tax rates, it was also a result of these firms using Ireland to directly access the European labour market. We evidence this contention via sectoral and geographic analyses while simultaneously showing that Irish fiscal policies have not redistributed gains from the recovery to the broader population. As a result, the economic recovery has been most actively felt by those in the FDI sectors, including foreign-national workers from the EU and beyond. We suggest that this experience indicates that Ireland's FDI-led model of economic development has created clear winners and losers, with significant distributional implications. The FDI growth regime been made possible by inward migration and European integration, but given the unequal distribution of the economic benefits that this generates, it is unlikely to be politically, or electorally, sustainable.
Introduction
While Ireland was among the worst hit European economies during the 2008 financial crisis, its recovery from the "ashes" has been equally dramatic, leading to a popular rebranding of this former Celtic "Tiger" as the Celtic "Phoenix". 2 However, some of the headline figures behind Ireland's recovery, such as 26.3 per cent GDP growth rate in 2015, are skewed by the vagaries of international corporate tax avoidance strategies (Regan 2016) , leading some to describe the Irish political economy as a case of "Leprechaun Economics" (Krugman 2016) . This perception has increased further in the aftermath of the Commission's ruling that Ireland granted the global tech giant, Apple, favourable tax treatment, which broke EU competition law. Yet despite this chicanery, there is significant evidence of a real underlying recovery. Notably, Brazys & Regan (2017) show that the Irish economy was beneficiary of a large uptick in foreign direct investment (FDI) in the computer and information services sector, or what is now colloquially referred to as "Europe's tech hub 3 " or Dublin's "Silicon Docks".
The prevailing consensus surrounding this FDI-led recovery is that it has been fueled by a low corporate tax rate. Brazys & Regan (2017) problematize this assumption by demonstrating that the Irish FDI growth model is an outcome of a decades long, forward looking enterprise strategy, coordinated by business-state elites in the public sector. In this paper we develop this argument further, by linking it into broader political dynamics of the EU. We argue that whilst low corporate taxes were a necessary condition to attract high-tech FDI from Silicon Valley, it is inward migration of skilled labour from the rest of Europe that has led to the creation of a high tech business cluster.
Put simply: it was the free movement of peoples, and the inflow of a multi-lingual workforce from the rest of the EU, which created Dublin's "Silicon Docks". Hence, we argue that inward migration, and the cluster effect of skilled labour, associated with the process of European integration, matters much more than low corporate taxes in creating Ireland's FDI export growth regime.
Empirically, we look at the distributional effects of Ireland's high-tech export growth model to analyse if it is compatible with further levels of economic integration in the EU.
We suggest that while Ireland has been able to carve out a unique growth model under both European and global market constraints, this growth model faces significant pressures both internally and externally. Externally, the growth model is not compatible with the drive toward corporate tax harmonization in the EU, given that corporate tax competition is a core part of the strategic arsenal that state-business elites use to sell "Ireland Inc.". However, our central claim is that Ireland's high-tech FDI growth model may come unstuck from within, primarily because it is built on a fragile electoral coalition. Our analysis suggests that Ireland's Internet-tech sector is built on the back of inward migration of high-skilled labour from other EU countries. These businessfinance professionals don't have a vote, and whilst Irish workers benefit indirectly from the expansion of domestic demand, these jobs are primarily located in the low-skill, low-wage service sector, leading to an increasingly dualized labour force.
In order to evidence our assertion that Ireland's FDI-led growth model is made possible by the free movement of peoples in the EU, and that this creates winners and losers, we proceed in three parts. We first move beyond Brazys & Regan (2017) by developing a theoretical framework for the political economy of an FDI-led growth model within Europe, looking at the politics of "labour supply" and "tax competition" both within and beyond the state. We next evaluate our claim by examining the sectoral and geographic make-up of FDI driving the economic recovery in Ireland, showing that while the FDIled recovery in computer services is real, it has bypassed significant portions of the Irish demos. We then conclude with thoughts on the sustainability of this growth model in the face of domestic, EU-level and global political economy pressures. Anne Wren's edited volume (2013) , Thelen (2014) , Beramendi & Hausermann et al (2015) and recent work by Baccaro & Pontusson (2016) , describes how internationally traded services are at the leading edge of high-value global production, and built around distinct producer group and electoral coalitions. While the traditional, cost-based, price sensitive export-led growth regime that colored Europe's austerity policies may be suitable for (relatively) labor intensive, manufactured goods, it is far less relevant for export sectors of high-value services, such as ICT and finance, due to the nature of production and consumption of those services. Whereas low and medium tech manufactured goods in Germany, Eastern and Central Europe may require comparatively low levels of skilled labor and/or vocationally specific trained labor, high-valued services necessitate a general-skilled and university trained work force, where a premium is placed on flexibility, interpersonal and human relational capabilities (Culpepper 2003; Ansell 2008; Busemeyer & Trampusch 2012 ).
The Political Economy of an FDI-led Growth Model in Europe
This observation is particularly important in the context of European integration (Fabbrini 2013; Schimmelfennig 2015) . The political and institutional conditions that are favorable to the strategies of those firms seeking to industrialize the services sector, through the digital economy (such as Google), are fundamentally different to the constraints facing firms in manufacturing-led growth models, such as Germany. It is now broadly accepted that upon joining the Euro currency, Germany instituted a system-wide low inflation regime that gave them significant comparative advantage over their Eurozone trading partners (Johnston & Regan 2016 ). Central to this was a coordinated internal devaluation, led by unions and employers in the manufacturing sector, and which was specifically aimed at reducing unit labor costs, whilst retaining core employment (Hassel 2014) . This beggar-thy-neighbor strategy of wage repression led to rising inequalities and contributed to the current account surplus of Germany, feeding imbalances within the Eurozone, and broadly informs the EU's labour market response to crisis today (see Blyth 2013; Hall 2012; Streeck 2014; Storm 2014; Regan 2015; Nölke 2016; Stockhammer 2016; Schmidt 2016 for a critique).
The problem with this analysis, when applied to the "Silicon Docks", is that firms in internationally traded services do not compete on the basis of labor costs and wage restraint. On the contrary, they compete through offering their workers lucrative sales and stock options, social insurance schemes and other favorable working conditions that have traditionally been associated with unionized companies. 4 In Ireland and Britain, ICT, finance and legal services are the highest paid sectors of the economy. In terms of the supply-side, beyond a pool of a university educated, generalist, and a flexible labor force, high-tech service sectors benefit from the clustering effect of skilled labor, whether this is computational or multi-lingual. When new companies locate/invest in a city (such as London, Amsterdam or Dublin) with a sectoral cluster they can effectively recruit their workers directly from this labor market (Combes and Duranton, 2006) . These are the "supply side" conditions of high-tech service growth models typically associated 'neoliberal economies' (Ban 2015; Bohle & Greskovits 2012) . Crucially, these "supply side" considerations are qualitatively distinct from traditional manufacturing, in that their competitiveness is fundamentally dependent upon the free movement of peoples, particularly within the EU.
Beyond a flexible and skilled labor force, tax structures are also disproportionately important for high-value service exporting firms when contrasted with labor-intensive manufacturing. As noted in Doh et al. (2009: 930) , the nature of service exports is ambiguous as the production, and indeed the delivery, of these exports need not occur in the same geographic space (Doh, Bunyaratavej, & Hahn, 2009) . They are interlinked via complex global supply chains. As described by Lipsey (2010: 99) this ambiguity has allowed firms, such as Apple, to vastly overstate their value-added in low-tax jurisdictions and that this "problem … is probably worse for trade in services than trade in goods". Thus, the tax term in the profit functions becomes relatively more important for firms that trade in high-value services both absolutely and in comparison to other determinants, including unit labor costs. But corporate tax is not the only determinant driving investment in FDI growth regimes. As noted above the motivation comes from the business cluster effects, associated with thick labour markets, and which underlines that an FDI growth model in high-tech services is not simply a synonym for a tax haven. What Wren et al (2013) and Brazys & Regan (2017) , in addition to large parts of the political economy literature, do not fully consider, however, are the political and electoral consequences of a high-tech FDI growth model, especially within the context of an integrated European and global economy. As we evidence in our empirical analysis, Ireland's high-tech FDI growth model has distinct distributional implications. The traditional variant of a state-led industrial policy sought to build on the notion of specialisation and comparative advantage (Hall 1986 , Hancké et al 2007 . However, rather than pursuing sector or industry-level specialisation, a state-led enterprise policy aimed at FDI is more concerned with activity specialisation. In this sense, industrial policy is better conceived as "enterprise policy", given that it more about horizontal specialisation than vertical specialisation. In particular, "enterprise policy" seeks to specialise in high-value activities within the global supply chain of multinational firms.
The distributional implications
This implies developing domestic institutions that are favorable to the political and economic interests of multinational corporations.
A key component of this is a fluid and open labour market. This leads to two important observations on the politics of labour supply in an FDI-led growth model. First, skilled ICT labour is highly-specialized and, thus, relatively immobile across sectors.
Accordingly, a hardware engineer may not be able to transition easily to a software engineer, much less to a multi-lingual IT support agent. Second, the labour needs of a service firm within complex supply chains may change more rapidly than the ability of training workers with those skills. Accordingly, "supply side policies" in the labour market will either need to be sufficiently deep or sufficiently open. In a small open economy, access to the five hundred million strong EU labour market provides the necessary depth to attract FDI. Hence, it is perhaps no surprise that Ireland and Switzerland are the two countries in Europe (one a member of the EU, the other a member of the EEA) with the highest percentage of "non-national workers" in their labour force (Afonso 2012) .
By pursuing FDI in high-tech services, a state-led enterprise policy necessarily advantages high-skilled labour at the detriment of its unskilled counterpart. The political economy of classical specialisation assumes that the gains from the comparative advantaged sector can be used to compensate those in disadvantaged sectors through tax and spend policies (Dancygier & Walter 2015) . However, in practice, the distributional bargain has not always been perceived as just or adequate.
Periods of political unrest have emerged when disadvantaged sectors feel as though the gains from trade and specialization have not been sufficiently disbursed. For a state pursuing an FDI-services growth model, the underlying logic is no different, but the situation is complicated when the latter is dependent upon high levels of inward migration. If and when the gains from high-tech and high-wage employment accrue to small segment of the population, be they nationals or migrants, and not to the broadbased workforce, the likelihood of political discontent increases. In such an instance, the state risks alienating its domestic political legitimacy by promoting an economic growth model that accrues gains more to small segment of high-skilled workers than to the bulk of the electorate. Brexit is clear cut case of a political backlash against this type of growth regime (Goodwin & Heath 2016) . Given the structural similarities of their economies, this should perhaps send a warning signal to Irish policymakers.
In the section below, we consider the distributional consequences of Ireland's FDI growth model, which is heavily reliant on free movement and openness to the EU labour market, and its economic recovery since 2008. We analyse the distributional consequences of Ireland's state led FDI-oriented enterprise policy along several dimensions: sectoral, wages, geographic, and national origin. Our hypothesis is that Ireland's FDI growth model has resulted in distributional gains to high-skilled workers (from Ireland and the wider EU) in high-value, traded service sectors that are geographically clustered in Dublin, but not elsewhere. We evaluate these claims via descriptive statistics and qualitative evidence. We then relate these observations back to the politics of comparative political economy and European integration. The Irish FDI growth model: who wins?
We first examine the Irish recovery in the context of a sectoral analysis. Brazys & Regan (2017) demonstrate that the Irish recovery vis-à-vis the rest of the Euro periphery is driven by internationally traded service exports, using a detailed case study of FDI into computer and information services, and the role of the IDA and business-state elites in shaping Dublin's "Silicon Docks". In this paper we consider investment, wage, export and employment data across all Irish sectors using descriptive statistics, difference in means tests, and qualitative evidence.
Sectoral investment
To analyse FDI sectoral investment we use the annual reports from Ireland's Industrial Development Agency (IDA), which includes a detailed list of companies investing in Ireland in that year, the country origin of the investment, and the sector. 
Sectoral Wages
We next consider if the investment trends illustrated above are also reflected in distributional consequence of wages between the sectors. Using quarterly data from the Irish Central Statistics Office (CSO), we consider wages across the high-value NACE sectors discussed above, and compare them to all other sectors. The CSO recalculated its statistics starting in 2008, which is a useful starting point for considering wage dynamics in the context of the post-crisis economic recovery. 
Sectoral Employment
Closely related to sectoral differences in wages, we also consider sectoral differences in unemployment. As above, we consider the dynamics of employment in the FDI sectors compared to all other sectors. Rather than looking at absolute numbers, we consider a four-quarter moving average of the percent change to smooth seasonal effects. We view all of the data as qualified support for our contention that there are clear winners and losers to the Irish FDI growth model, which is increasingly based around inward investment from Silicon Valley. The FDI sectors saw the best employment and wage dynamics throughout the crisis and recovery. Unfortunately, our employment data in manufacturing is not disaggregated by activity. Thus, we are unable to asses if the poor employment performance in manufacturing is due to falling job numbers in the foreign FDI sectors of manufacturing (medical and electronics) or in Irish-domestic manufacturing activity. We suspect the latter but we are unable to verify this supposition. One final note is that while certain FDI sectors saw a differential improvement, the overall employment levels in the "other" sectors dwarfs that of the FDI sectors, with employment over three times greater in these "other" sectors.
Geographic concentration
The sectoral analysis above demonstrates significant support for the contention that Ireland's FDI-sectors disproportionally felt the recovery since 2008. In this section we turn to an additional component of enterprise policy: geographic clustering. As discussed above, and in greater detail in Brazys & Regan (2017) , the economic geography of FDI in internationally traded services, such as finance and ICT, will promote a clustering effect. In turn, this is largely driven by the human capital externalities of thick labour markets (Moretti 2012 ). As such, in the analysis below, we evaluate the extent to which certain economic activities have been spatially related. We look first at the geographic distribution of FDI in all export sectors before focusing in on specific concentrations of enterprise activity. populous cities/counties. Notably, these cities account for nearly half of all FDI in hightech manufacturing, over three quarters of investment in PST, and almost 85 per cent of FDI projects in ICT. While these are significant values in themselves, they are also disproportionate, to varying degrees, given the share of the population in these cities.
The share of manufacturing, 49.4%, is roughly proportionate to the population share of 44.5% in these cities. This is not the case in PST and ICT investment.
The most prominent example of geographic clustering is the concentration of ICT projects in Dublin, where, in particular, we see clustering in "information and computer services" and "computer programming and consultancy" activities. Of the 143 FDI projects we code in the ICT category 7 , 95, or 66%, of them are located in Dublin. This includes global internet giants such as Google, Facebook, LinkedIn, Salesforce, Twitter and Amazon in Dublin's "Silicon Docks". But it also includes firms located in larger 7 Either as a primary code "J63" in the NACE codes, or as the sector of a firm establishing its headquarters, which is coded as "M70" in the NACE codes.
industrial parks in the county suburbs, such as Microsoft. Likewise, 57, or 60%, of the "computer programming and consultancy" FDI projects were located in Dublin. As shown in figure 4 below, this clustering effect really took off from 2007, and in terms of the internet-sector, it was largely driven by the human capital externalities associated with the expansion of Google. Google opened their European HQ in Dublin in 2004, and employed less than 50 people. By 2016, they employed over 5,500. The 80 additional "born on the internet" firms from Silicon Valley that directly followed Google directly feed off workers in this labour market. Further, as we show below, these workers are predominately from the wider EU.
Source: IDA Annual Reports and Authors' calculations.
What's important to note here is that the presence of a high-tech business cluster creates a labour pool which attracts more FDI, creating what Irish business-political elites call an "innovative eco-system". Sales and advertising make up the majority of activities in these tech-based firms i.e. the money/revenue making part of tech firms, and where a premium is placed on recruiting multi-lingual workers with direct knowledge and understanding of their country specific (home) markets, within the EU and the Middle East. This geographic amalgamation has important distributional consequences. While labour is potentially mobile throughout the state, geographic concentration of economic 
The Irish FDI growth model: who loses?
The descriptive statistics and analysis above clearly illustrate how the Irish recovery has been dominated by Ireland's FDI growth model, in particular, the tech sector.
Moreover, the recovery activity in the ICT sector has involved a disproportionate number of non-Irish workers, mainly from other EU member states. In this regard, European integration has been a core determinant of Ireland's economic recovery.
While EU citizens are fully entitled to work in Ireland, they are not enfranchised to vote in national elections and, as such, are relatively marginalized in the domestic political/electoral process. Accordingly, in this section we consider the extent to which the Irish government has engaged in distributional spending in order to secure the support of constituents in the domestic and non-FDI sectors of the political economy,
given that almost four times as many workers are employed in these sectors compared to the FDI growth sectors. Considering all of the analysis above, it is clear that there are winners and losers to
Ireland's high-tech growth model. Those who have carried the burden of adjustment are workers in the low to middle income classes of the social distribution (Whelan, Nolan & Maître 2016) . These workers saw their services from the state decrease while at that same time seeing an increase in their tax burden. The average working family with both parents in employment have seen their income taxes increase by €6,000, a 3% reduction in their wages, and declining public infrastructure. These are also the same workers with the largest vote share. Thus, while Ireland's FDI growth model has driven a "headline recovery", this recovery has not been felt by the mass of the voting population. Importantly, unlike the UK, this has not led to an electoral backlash against the EU or the free movement of workers, rather it is directed at the established political parties. According to Farrell & Suiter (2016) , the electorate has never been more volatile, and the party system more fragmented. In 2016 the three main centrist parties received their lowest ever vote share in the history of the state, whilst a loose collection of independent populists won their largest ever share of the vote. Our argument is that this is hardly surprising when one examines the winners and losers of the Irish FDIgrowth regime. Further, given the growth of the Internet sectors, those who work in these firms don't have a vote, as they are primarily disenfranchised EU citizens.
Discussion: Ireland's FDI Growth Model and European Integration
As evidenced above, Ireland's FDI-led growth regime, which is coordinated by businessstate elites, and the outcome of a decades-long forward looking enterprise policy, has had significantly asymmetric distributional consequences in Ireland across sectors, geographic region and citizenship. While we argue that this poses a political economy problem for the domestic sustainability of Ireland's growth model, we also argue that it has consequences for the politics of European integration. Domestically, Ireland's FDIled growth regime is likely to lead to increased polarization between high-skilled and low-skilled workers. This tension will be exacerbated by the fact that these high-skilled and high-wage workers are increasingly less likely to be Irish citizens, and more likely to be citizens from other member-states of the EU. This has not yet become a politicised issue in Ireland, given the near absence of an anti-migrant and anti-EU political party, in addition to the near absence of an anti-EU media (i.e. there is no equivalent to UKIP or the anti-EU tabloid press in Ireland 
